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I. INTRODUCTION 
Statutes and regulations endeavor to direct behavior 
throughout society and allow injured individuals to recover for 
harm. However, the enactment of a particular law—or the absence 
thereof—can have other unintended consequences. What facially 
appears to facilitate resolution can, in practice, actually construct 
hurdles that inhibit this very goal. This paradox is especially 
prevalent in laws affecting the elder population in need of long-
term care services, such as in a nursing home, assisted living, or 
other long-term care setting. 
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Older adults in long-term care facilities need legal services just 
like any other subset of our population but have a unique set of 
needs. When injuries occur in the long-term care setting, the older 
adult or a family member may seek accountability. Yet, they often 
lack the financial means or energy to bring a legal claim. A nursing 
home resident is not focused on enforcing his or her rights or 
suing the very company providing him or her with necessary care. 
The resident is often either unaware of a potential legal claim or is 
unable to contact an attorney, let alone retain one. Even if a claim 
is pursued, the current legal framework limits recovery and 
accountability for older victims. Without the ability to meaningfully 
pursue their legal claims, society sends the wrong message to older 
adults—essentially stripping them of voice under the current legal 
framework. Legal claims on behalf of the elder population range 
anywhere from breach of contract, retaliatory discharge, and 
medical malpractice, to violation of rights. This article explores the 
claim of medical malpractice, in particular, and highlights the 
barriers older adults encounter under Minnesota law in trying to 
resolve their claims. It concludes by offering some proposed 
changes to improve the legal landscape for our elder population. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The number of individuals age sixty-five and older is on the 
rise due to the fact that baby boomers—those born from 1946 to 
1964—started to turn sixty-five in 2011. From 2000 to 2010, the 
number of Americans age sixty-five and over increased by 15.1%.1 
Among those ages sixty-five and over, the number of males age 
eighty-five and older increased by 46.5%, more than any other 
demographic.2 In Minnesota, the number of people age sixty-five 
and older is expected to almost double between the years 2010 and 
2030. In 2025, for the first time ever, the population in Minnesota 
of people age sixty-five and older is expected to exceed the 
population of children age five to seventeen for the first time ever.3 
 
 1.  CARRIE A. WERNER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE OLDER POPULATION: 2010, at 
1 (2011), http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-09.pdf. 
 2.  Id. at 4. 
 3.  Aging Overview, MINN. COMPASS, http://www.mncompass.org/aging 
/overview (last visited May 8, 2016). 
3
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Given the recent increase in the older population, it comes as 
no surprise that the number of those needing long-term care4 
services is also on the rise.5 However, the increase is reflected in the 
assisted living facilities and smaller group home models, while the 
number of individuals in nursing homes6 has actually decreased. 
The percentage of the population age sixty-five and older in 
nursing homes was 5.1% in 1990, 4.5% in 2000, and 3.1% in 2010.7 
Nationwide in 2010, 1.5 million people were residents of a nursing 
home, with 1.2 million age sixty-five8 and older and 74% female.9 In 
Minnesota, the number of nursing home beds has actually 
decreased by 32% since 1975, from 45,448 to 31,190.10 Minnesota 
has had a moratorium on building new nursing homes11 for 
approximately the last thirty years, reflecting a public policy of 
encouraging people to stay in their homes. 
The decrease in nursing home beds, coupled with an increase 
in the number of people needing long-term services, means an 
increase in other services. As a result, assisted living and smaller 
residential care homes have seen a large population increase. In 
Minnesota, unlike other states, assisted living facilities are not 
licensed.12 Rather, the landlord registers the building as a “housing 
 
 4.  For the purposes of this article, “long-term care” references nursing 
homes, assisted living facilities, group homes, or other multiple-resident facilities 
in which individuals receive home care services. 
 5.  See WERNER, supra note 1, at 18. 
 6.  For the purposes of this article, “nursing home” references facilities 
licensed by the Minnesota Department of Health as a nursing home, including a 
“skilled nursing facility” under 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3, referring to facilities accepting 
Medicare funding; a “nursing facility” under 42 U.S.C. § 1396r, referring to 
facilities accepting Medicaid funding, and facilities licensed as Boarding Care 
Homes by the Minnesota Department of Health. See MINN. STAT. § 144.50 (2014).  
 7.  Compare WERNER, supra note 1, at 18 tbl.7, with U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE 
65 YEARS AND OVER POPULATION: 2000, at 7–8 tbl.8 (2001), https://www.census.gov 
/prod/2001pubs/c2kbr01-10.pdf. 
 8.  It is worth noting that 300,000 nursing home residents were under age 
sixty-five. See WERNER, supra note 1, at 18.  
 9.  See id.  
 10.  As of March 24, 2015, the Minnesota Department of Health licensed 
approximately 374 nursing homes and twenty-six boarding care homes for a 
combined total of 31,190 beds. MINN. DEP’T OF HEALTH, 2015 DIRECTORY: LICENSED, 
CERTIFIED AND REGISTERED HEALTH CARE FACILITIES AND SERVICES I (2015), 
http://www.health.state.mn.us/divs/fpc/directory/2015mdhdirectory.pdf. 
 11.  See MINN. STAT. § 144A.71. 
 12.  See NAT’L CTR. FOR ASSISTED LIVING, ASSISTED LIVING STATE REGULATORY 
REVIEW 2013, at 102 (2013) [hereinafter ASSISTED LIVING REVIEW 2013], https:// 
4
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with services” (HWS) unit, and a home care service entity comes in 
to provide services. A HWS registration notifies the public that the 
facility is serving the elderly, disabled, and vulnerable populations 
and includes assisted living settings, group homes, and facilities in 
which residents receive some type of home care service. As of 
March 2015, approximately 2225 HWS registrations were issued by 
the Minnesota Department of Health.13 These registrations are up 
55% from March 2009, when 1434 HWS registrations were issued.14 
In addition, the number of home care providers licensed in 
Minnesota grew from 1369 in 2009 to 1629 in 2015.15 This shift to 
HWS and home care is significant, especially in Minnesota, because 
the consumer and resident must be aware that even though the 
assisted living facility or similar entity appears to be a 24/7 care 
model, such as in a nursing home, it is not. All “non-nursing 
homes” are bound by a landlord/tenant agreement with home care 
services coming into the HWS-registered building. 
The ramification of this flexible and broad long-term care 
arrangement is that coordination of care may be lacking, which 
creates a greater risk of residents falling through the cracks of the 
system and suffering injury or harm. The regulations and laws 
surrounding home care—while significantly strengthened in recent 
years in Minnesota16—lack the clarity necessary to hold facilities 
accountable for such harm. 
Another significant consideration related to long-term care for 
the elderly is the expected rise in mental health diagnoses. 
Currently, one in four older adults experiences a mental disorder 
 
www.ahcancal.org/ncal/resources/Documents/2013_reg_review.pdf. 
 13.  MINN. DEP’T OF HEALTH, supra note 10, at I. 
 14.  Compare LYNN AVES ET AL., MINN. HOUSE RESEARCH DEP’T, REGULATION OF 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES FACILITIES 9 (2010), http:// 
www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/hhsfacl.pdf (noting that HWS licenses 
totaled 1434 in 2009), with MINN. DEP’T OF HEALTH, supra note 10, at I tbl.2 (listing 
HWS licensures as 2225 in 2015). 
 15.  Compare AVES ET AL., supra note 14, at 16 (noting the numbers of home 
care licensure classes A, B, C, and F, which add up to 1369 in 2009), with MINN. 
DEP’T OF HEALTH, supra note 10, at I tbl.1 (listing home care licensures as 1629 in 
2015). Note that the system of home care licensure changed significantly in the 
2013 legislative session, changing home care licensures from distinctions of A, B, 
C, and F to “basic” and “comprehensive” home care licenses, thus diminishing 
some ability to compare the number of licenses in 2009 to 2015. See Act of May 23, 
2013, ch. 108, 2013 Minn. Laws 335, 335–73 (as codified at MINN. STAT. §§ 
144A.471–.483). 
 16.  See 2013 Minn. Laws at 335–73. 
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such as depression, anxiety, or dementia, and an estimated two-
thirds of older adults with mental health diagnoses do not receive 
necessary treatment.17 The number of older adults with mental 
health diagnoses is expected to double to 15 million by 2030.18 In 
Minnesota, the number of individuals age sixty-five and older with 
Alzheimer’s disease, the most common form of dementia, is 
expected to rise 34.8% from 2015 to 2025—from 89,000 to 
120,000.19 
With the increase in the number of older adults needing long-
term care services and the increase in diagnoses such as 
Alzheimer’s, comes greater vulnerability for residents.20 With 
greater vulnerability comes greater potential for harm and injury. 
Laws and regulations exist for protection from such harms, such as 
the Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act of 1987 (OBRA ‘87), 
which established regulations for nursing homes.21 While it is 
arguable that such regulations apply to assisted living and other 
long-term care models in Minnesota, the law does not present clear 
standards by which breaches of the standard of care can be 
measured in the home care setting.22 When accountability for such 
harm is pursued, whether in the nursing home or home care 
model, the law provides barriers to resolution that diminish the 
voice of the older population. 
III. ISSUES 
A majority of long-term care providers in Minnesota are 
performing great services to the older population. They face 
adverse circumstances yet strive daily to meet the needs of 
 
 17.  Healthy Aging Fact Sheet, NAT’L COUNCIL ON AGING, https://www.ncoa.org 
/wp-content/uploads/FactSheet_HealthyAging.pdf (last updated Jan. 2014). 
 18.  Id.  
 19.  2015 Alzheimer’s Disease Facts and Figures, ALZHEIMER’S ASS’N, http:// 
www.alz.org/facts/downloads/facts_figures_2015.pdf (last visited May 8, 2016). 
 20.  See, e.g., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, LONG-TERM CARE 
PROVIDERS AND SERVICES USERS IN THE UNITED STATES: DATA FROM THE NATIONAL 
STUDY OF LONG-TERM CARE PROVIDERS, 2013–2014, at 40 (2016), http:// 
www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_03/sr03_038.pdf (documenting Alzheimer’s 
disease incidence across care settings). 
 21.  Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 
Stat. 1330 (1987) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3(b)(4), 
1396(b)(4)); 42 C.F.R. § 483.25 (2015). See generally 42 U.S.C. ch. 7 (2012); id.       
§ 1302. 
 22.  See generally MINN. STAT. ch. 144A (2014). 
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residents. Innovative ideas in long-term care continue to be 
pursued to reduce risk of harm and to improve services. However, 
injuries and death still occur. Based on this author’s experience in 
bringing medical malpractice claims against long-term care 
facilities, most injuries in long-term care facilities center on four 
main themes: (1) lack of training; (2) lack of equipment; (3) lack 
of staffing; and (4) lack of coordination of care. Common injuries 
include falls, pressure sores, infections, and medication errors. Less 
common, but on the rise, are assault (including sexual assault), 
abuse, and drug diversion via taking of the elders’ medication. The 
ramifications of injury in a vulnerable population have a spiral 
effect. The resident who falls and experiences a hip fracture at age 
eighty-five or ninety may never walk again because he or she is not 
a candidate for surgery and is unable to regain strength to fully 
heal. An unchecked pressure sore on the feet can lead to gangrene 
and amputation, particularly for someone with peripheral vascular 
complications. Knowledge of the preexisting conditions do not 
excuse poor care but rather allow for increased notice to provide 
good care to account for the risk factors present. 
Today, many providers split out their approach to care, 
particularly with the home care model. The home care provider 
that is a main presence at the facility or at home often performs the 
activities of daily living but not skilled care, such as wound care.23 A 
wound care provider comes in specifically to treat the wound but 
not to provide other services, even in nursing homes at times.24 A 
hospice team often comes in separately from the nursing home or 
home care staff.25 The resident already likely has a doctor who 
makes quarterly (or sometimes monthly) rounds and a nurse 
practitioner that may see the resident monthly. Fractionated care 
often means that a particular care issue gets lost in the shuffle and 
the resident suffers. No sole provider or care facility sees 
themselves as having the responsibility to follow through on 
 
 23.  See generally ASSISTED LIVING REVIEW 2013, supra note 12.  
 24.  For more information on wound care, see Publications, JEFFREY M. LEVINE, 
http://jmlevinemd.com/publications (last visited May 8, 2016); Educational and 
Clinical Resources, NAT’L PRESSURE ULCER ADVISORY PANEL, http://www.npuap.org 
/resources/educational-and-clinical-resources/ (last visited May 8, 2016). 
 25.  See, e.g., Matthew E. Misichko, A Help-Ing Hand: How Legislation Can 
Reform the Affordable Care Act and Hospice Care to Prioritize Comfort and Prepare for the 
Baby Boomer Generation, 21 ELDER L.J. 419, 431–32 (2014) (noting the 
congressionally intended separateness of hospice care from nursing home care). 
7
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ensuring that a condition is not worsening or reporting changes in 
condition. Changes in condition present one of the greatest 
challenges for providers. Under 42 C.F.R. § 483.10(b)(11)(i), the 
provider has the duty to notify a resident’s physician and family 
member about any changes in condition.26 This one duty becomes 
extremely challenging with multiple providers involved in care, yet 
the duty remains and the resident relies on the facility to intervene 
when harm arises. 
Regardless of how and why injury or death occurred, the law 
allows older adults, just like their younger counterparts, to seek 
redress through the courts. Theoretically, the older adult could 
bring a claim of medical malpractice and seek damages for injury 
as a result of a breach of standard of care. The older adult has the 
time, resources, and capacity to hire an attorney to seek 
compensation. Theoretically, the injury could be isolated to the 
particular breach and experts could testify as to what medical 
conditions are related to the injury. The courthouse doors provide 
equal opportunity to older adults to work through the process to 
resolve the matter. Theoretically, the family members left behind 
after a death are able to pursue the claim on behalf of their loved 
one, including getting medical records to investigate the harm 
done. Theoretically, the claim moves swiftly to resolution prior to 
the death of an older plaintiff. However, the human dynamic of 
medical malpractice claims on behalf of the elderly against long-
term care providers is not confined to theory. In the real world, the 
voice of the elder is squeezed out by the practical implications of 
the law. 
There are many practical barriers in medical malpractice 
claims brought by older adults against long-term care facilities. 
These barriers can be insurmountable in some cases, or more 
minor in others. But they nevertheless impede resolution in a 
manner not experienced by other age or ability groups. Legislators 
did not contemplate the impact of such laws on the older 
population, and that by highlighting these barriers, improvements 
can eventually be made in valuing the voice of the older population 
in the face of harm. Delay in medical malpractice claims on behalf 
of the elderly or vulnerable adults is extremely troubling given that 
if the elder dies, pain and suffering damages do not survive the 
decedent. This sends the wrong message to long-term care 
 
 26.  42 C.F.R. § 483.10(b)(11). 
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providers—that even if the resident dies in the face of egregious 
negligence, the claim will most likely go away. 
Below are some of the barriers experienced by the older 
population when bringing a medical malpractice claim: 
A. Providers Challenging Health Care Agent 
Providers challenging that a health care agent has authority 
under a health care directive to make decisions as to care and at 
times to retrieve medical records, based on the principal lacking 
decision-making capacity. 
 
Minnesota Statutes chapter 145C sets forth the requirements 
for executing a health care directive in Minnesota.27 In other 
states,28 a health care directive is also called an advanced care 
directive,29 health care power of attorney,30 or living will.31 The 
general idea is to formalize an individual’s wishes for care and/or 
to appoint a health care agent to make health care decisions for 
the individual. A health care directive may list both health care 
instructions, as well as appoint a health care agent, but need only 
do one of the two.32 
Under Minnesota’s health care directive statute, in order for 
the agency appointment (or any instructions for that matter) to 
“vest,” or become valid, the principal must lack decision-making 
 
 27.  See MINN. STAT. ch. 145C. 
 28.  Minnesota Statutes chapter 145C and the language of “health care 
directive” replaces Minnesota Statutes chapter 145B, which used the old language 
of a “living will.” Compare MINN. STAT. ch. 145C, with MINN. STAT. ch. 145B. 
Although Minnesota Statutes chapter 145B still exists on the books, it applies only 
to living wills executed before August 1, 1998. See MINN. STAT. § 145B.011. 
 29.  E.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8A-4 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg., 1st Spec., 
and 2d Spec. Sess.); CAL. PROB. CODE § 4701 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. 
Sess. and ch. 1 of 2015-2016 2d Ex. Sess.); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-601 
(West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess. of Gen. Assemb.); 20 PA. STAT. AND CONS. 
STAT. ANN. § 5422 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess. Acts 1-96); TEX. HEALTH 
& SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.002 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess. of the 84th 
Leg.). 
 30.  E.g., N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1501(2)(j) (McKinney, Westlaw through 
2016). 
 31.  E.g. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/1 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-495 
of the 2015 Reg. Sess.); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 154.03 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Act 
127). 
 32.  MINN. STAT. § 145C.03, subdiv. 1(6). 
9
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capacity.33 This means that before a health care provider may 
honor the agent’s wishes or in some circumstances provide the 
agent with medical records, the provider may first determine 
whether the principal can make health care decisions on his or her 
own.34 With all the emphasis on having a health care directive on 
file with the provider, most of the time the health care provider will 
simply honor the authority given in the directive and is glad to be 
able to talk with someone in authority to facilitate decisions. 
However, based on Minnesota law, the provider may challenge 
whether the grant of authority has officially been made by 
requiring a finding that the principal lacks decision-making 
capacity.35 Minnesota Statutes section 145C.01, subdivision 1(b) 
defines decision-making capacity as: “[T]he ability to understand 
the significant benefits, risks, and alternatives to proposed health 
care and to make and communicate a health care decision.”36 
Pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 145C.02, the 
determination of decision-making capacity is to be made by the 
principal’s attending physician37: 
A principal with the capacity to do so may execute a 
health care directive. A health care directive may include 
one or more health care instructions to direct health care 
providers, others assisting with health care, family 
members, and a health care agent. A health care directive 
may include a health care power of attorney to appoint a 
health care agent to make health care decisions for the 
principal when the principal, in the judgment of the 
principal’s attending physician, lacks decision-making 
capacity, unless otherwise specified in the health care 
directive.38 
The provider may challenge that the health care directive is 
valid when he or she legitimately becomes concerned about 
 
 33.  Id. §§ 145C.01, subdiv. 1b, 145C.02, 145C.06. 
 34.  See id. § 145C.08. 
 35.  See id. § 145C.06. 
 36.  Id. § 145C.01, subdiv. 1(b). 
 37.  Minnesota Statutes chapter 145C does not define the term “attending 
physician”; however, it is presumed to mean the treating and/or primary care 
physician. Compare id. § 145C.01, with id. § 145C.07, subdiv. 1, and id. § 145C.06. 
Additionally, an “attending physician” may not act as a health care agent if the 
physician is attending to the principal on the date of the execution of the health 
care directive. Id. § 145C.03, subdiv. 2(b)(1). 
 38.  Id. § 145C.02. 
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listening to the agent when the principal can adequately 
understand and communicate his or her wishes. However, the 
provider may also use this required finding of decision-making 
capacity to manipulate a result. For instance, when the provider 
disagrees with the agent’s decisions regarding the principal’s 
health, the provider may state that it will not honor the health care 
directive because the principal can speak for himself or herself, 
thus blocking the influence and instructions of the agent. This 
blocking can happen in the nursing home setting when the agent 
wants to send the principal to the hospital (or does not want to), 
and the provider believes otherwise. 
One part of the health care directive is often authorizing the 
agent to receive medical records.39 In fact, drafters of a health care 
directive should specifically include language that appoints the 
agent as a “personal representative” under the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), authorizing 
the agent to receive medical records (otherwise known as 
“protected health information”). If an injury occurs in a nursing 
home and the agent wishes to investigate the matter by reviewing 
medical records, the agent may be blocked from receiving medical 
records pending a determination by a physician that the resident 
lacks the requisite decision-making capacity.40 As a further potential 
hurdle in the process, the resident likely utilizes the physician 
associated with the nursing home as a primary care and treating 
physician, so the possibility exists that the physician may simply say 
that the principal lacks decision-making capacity. Not to mention, 
the physician may visit once every three months and thereby delay 
getting an opinion on the principal’s decision-making capacity. 
Nothing in Minnesota Statutes chapter 145C precludes the 
agent from adding other wishes to the document, thus adding to or 
 
 39.  Id. § 145C.08. 
 40.  This author has experienced this delay in obtaining records, with the 
nursing home stating that because the resident moved to another facility, the 
facility could not honor the agent/claimant’s request for medical records because 
it could not evaluate the former resident’s current condition to determine if he or 
she lacked decision-making capacity, pursuant to Minnesota Statutes chapter 
145C. The provider was willing to accept the written opinion of the former 
resident’s current physician as to decision-making capacity, but the process caused 
considerable delay. Delay is the nemesis of elder medical malpractice claims in 
Minnesota, given that if the resident dies, pain and suffering damages do not 
survive the decedent. 
11
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amending statutory language.41 In fact, Minnesota Statutes section 
145C.02 specifically states that the agent is appointed when the 
attending physician determines that the principal lacks decision-
making capacity, “unless otherwise specified in the health care 
directive.”42 Minnesota Statutes section 145C.05, subdivision 2(c) 
even more clearly states that “[a] health care directive may 
authorize a health care agent to make health care decisions for a 
principal even though the principal retains decision-making 
capacity.”43 
Therefore, to avoid the above delays, the drafter of the health 
care directive should: (1) ensure that HIPAA language is in the 
directive to allow for retrieval of medical records; (2) ensure that 
language for retrieval of medical records states that the agent has 
authority to do so, regardless of decision-making capacity; and (3) 
ensure that language regarding the appointment of the agent 
includes that an agent is appointed, regardless of decision-making 
capacity.44 While perhaps not foolproof in eliminating inquiry into 
whether the appointment has occurred, it may reduce hurdles in 
recognizing the grant of authority in the health care directive. 
B. Interpretation by Providers Concerning Medical Records Access 
The interpretation by health care providers that once a person 
dies, the authority granted under the health care directive to 
retrieve medical records ceases. 
 
When a loved one dies, the family naturally seeks answers. 
They want to know what happened, how their loved one died, and 
who may have been present or involved. This is particularly so in a 
long-term care setting when the expectation is that the resident is 
in the nursing home or assisted living facility specifically for the 
purpose of preventing injury or death by getting around the clock 
care. Some facilities will meet with the family and attempt to 
explain as best they can what happened. However, other facilities 
 
 41.  See MINN. STAT. § 145C.05. 
 42.  Id. § 145C.02. 
 43.  Id. § 145C.05, subdiv. 2(c). 
 44.  Note that under some circumstances the health care directive should not 
include language by which the agent can act even if the resident has decision-
making capacity, such as to prevent family members from making health care 
decisions that do not promote the best interests of the resident (based on the 
wishes of the resident). 
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will block information requests. This is particularly disadvantageous 
for bringing a medical malpractice claim since the plaintiff must 
seek review of medical records by a qualified provider who 
determines that negligence occurred prior to filing suit.45 If the 
family is not able to get the medical records, they cannot get the 
requisite review to bring a claim.46 
If the decedent had a health care directive allowing an agent 
to receive medical records, the provider will state that the ability for 
another to get medical records through the directive ceased upon 
death. However, that is not entirely true. Minnesota’s health care 
directive statute does not specifically address whether the authority 
granted under the directive ceases upon death.47 It certainly does 
not state that the health care directive ceases upon death, and in 
fact provides evidence that it is contemplated that the directive 
would continue after death. Minnesota Statutes section 145C.05, 
subdivisions 2(a)(5) and (7), suggest that the health care directive 
include instructions related to anatomical gifts and funeral 
directives, both of which would need to be carried out after death.48 
The following authority specifically allows a health care 
directive to continue to be effective even after death. 
1. Family Member if Government Entity 
Medical records from a government hospital or entity are 
made available to the surviving spouse, parents, children, siblings, 
and health care agent of the decedent pursuant to Minnesota 
Statutes section 13.384, subdivision 3(e).49 
2. Surviving Spouse, Parents, and Representative 
Minnesota Statutes section 144.291, subdivision 2(g), defines a 
“patient” as the individual receiving treatment as well as the 
surviving spouse, parents, and representative of the individual.50 
 
 45.  Minnesota Statutes section 145.682, subdivision 2 requires expert 
opinions in civil claims against a medical provider that allege a breach of the 
standard of medical care. 
 46.  See id. 
 47.  See id. § 145C.02. 
 48.  Id. § 145C.05, subdivs. 2(a)(5), (7). 
 49.  Id. § 13.384, subdiv. 3(e). 
 50.  Id. § 144.291, subdiv. 2(g). 
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Minnesota Statutes section 144.292, subdivision 5, states that the 
patient must be given a copy of his or her medical records.51 
3. Personal Representative Appointed Via a Will 
Even absent the formal appointment of the personal 
representative of an estate, a provider must also provide protected 
health information to a person appointed as personal 
representative in a will. This right to medical records of a decedent 
is generally recognized in Minnesota due to the personal 
representative being specifically allowed access to medical records 
under Minnesota Statutes section 144.293, subdivision 2.52 
4. Personal Representative of the Estate of the Deceased Individual 
Under federal law, the provider must disclose protected health 
information, upon request, to the personal representative of the 
estate of the decedent.53 In this case, the personal representative 
stands in the shoes of the decedent in making the request, as if the 
deceased individual made the request.54 
5. Family Members Involved in the Care of Decedent Prior to Death 
Effective March 26, 2013, the HIPAA/HITECH Act Omnibus 
Final Rules55 went into effect, making several clarifications to what 
is known at the “Privacy Rule” under 45 C.F.R. § 164.56 The Privacy 
Rule contains language that regulates the dissemination of 
protected health information.57 As one of the clarifications of the 
2013 Omnibus Rule, providers are to disclose the protected health 
information of a decedent to family members and others who were 
involved in the care or payment for care of the decedent, prior to 
death.58 The term “involved in care” is defined as the provider 
 
 51.  Id. § 144.292, subdiv. 5. 
 52.  Id. § 144.293, subdiv. 2.  
 53.  See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(g)(4) (2015). 
 54.  Id. § 164.502(g)(1). 
 55.  See Modifications to HIPAA Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 5566-01 (Jan. 25, 2013). 
 56.  45 C.F.R. § 164. 
 57.  See id. § 160.103 (defining “protected health information”). 
 58.  The Code of Federal Regulations provides: 
If the individual is deceased, a covered entity may disclose to a family 
member, or other persons identified in paragraph (b)(1) of this 
section who were involved in the individual’s care or payment for 
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having “reasonable assurance” that the family member was involved 
in the decedent’s care.59 However, the provider is not required to 
supply the requested information if the provider believes that 
disclosure is not appropriate; rather disclosure is permitted.60 
C. Legal Authority to Get Decendent’s Medical Records 
If the provider will not recognize the legal authority to get medical 
records of a decedent, a trustee must be appointed to get medical 
records. 
 
Even though the family should be able to get medical records 
on behalf of a decedent based on the aforementioned provisions 
listed in this article, the provider may yet resist disclosure of the 
medical records. Particularly with the newer Privacy Rule, 
disclosure of medical records to a family member who was involved 
with the decedent’s care prior to death is allowed but not 
required.61 At times, providers seem to utilize HIPAA privacy rules 
as a sword and not a shield when preventing disclosure of medical 
records in follow-up to an injury or death of a vulnerable adult. 
Pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 573.02, subdivision 3, a 
trustee must be appointed to bring a legal claim of wrongful death, 
or of personal injury where the decedent’s death is unrelated to the 
injury.62 Being appointed as a trustee is distinct from being 
appointed as a personal representative of an estate. The authority 
of the trustee is generally recognized by providers as allowing 
disclosure of medical records.63 However, it comes at a cost, both 
monetarily and—at times—personally, to even get the records for 
review of a possible injury or death claim.64 
 
health care prior to the individual’s death, protected health 
information of the individual that is relevant to such person’s 
involvement, unless doing so is inconsistent with any prior expressed 
preference of the individual that is known to the covered entity. 
Id. § 164.510(b)(5). 
 59.  Id. § 164.510(b)(1); see Modifications to HIPAA Rules, supra note 55, at 
5615. 
 60.  See Modifications to HIPAA Rules, supra note 55, at 5615–16. 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  MINN. STAT. § 573.02, subdiv. 3 (2014). 
 63.  See Modifications to HIPAA Rules, supra note 55, at 5615. 
 64.  See supra Section III.C; infra Section III.D. 
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D. Rejection of Authorization for Release of Medical Information 
The provider’s rejection of an authorization for release of medical 
information must meet the elements of compliance under federal 
law. 
 
Under federal HIPAA regulations regarding the disclosure of 
protected health information, an authorization to release 
information must contain certain statements and information.65 
Persons seeking to receive information need not use the provider’s 
own authorization. Instead, they can use an authorization that is in 
compliance with HIPAA regulations. The patient, by and through 
any designated third party, has a right of access to his or her 
protected health information.66 Furthermore, the provider is to 
supply the requested information within thirty days.67 While the 
authorization and right of access may be enforced through an 
administrative complaint through the Office of Civil Rights, such 
delay may prove costly to the elderly claimant.68 
E. Appointment of Trustee Process Is Not Conducive to Elder Client 
The appointment of trustee process itself is not conducive to the 
elder client. 
 
As stated above, Minnesota Statutes section 573.02 dictates that 
a trustee be appointed to bring a wrongful death or personal injury 
claim on behalf of a decedent.69 In other states, the personal 
representative of the estate of the decedent is authorized to bring 
the wrongful death or injury claim but not in Minnesota. 
Minnesota has a unique process of appointing a “trustee for the 
next of kin.”70 The process of trustee appointment is explained in 
the Minnesota General Rules of Practice, Rule 144.01, but the rule 
was not designed with elder decedents in mind, causing additional 
 
 65.  See 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(b)–(c) (2015). 
 66.  See id. § 164.524(a). 
 67.  Id. § 164.524(b)(2)(i). 
 68.  See generally HIPAA What to Expect, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/complaints/index.html (last visited May 
8, 2016). 
 69.  See MINN. STAT. § 573.02, subdiv. 3 (2014). 
 70.  See Ortiz v. Gavenda, 590 N.W.2d 119, 122 (Minn. 1999). 
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hurdles to bringing such a claim likely not intended under the 
law.71 
First, the trustee appointment requires notification to the next 
of kin of the decedent, defined as the living spouse, parents, 
children, grandparents, and siblings of the decedent.72 When the 
elder client is often age seventy-five or higher, notifying the siblings 
of the decedent can pose a problem. Oftentimes those siblings are 
in nursing homes or advanced in years themselves, with little 
connection to the decedent at this phase in life. Knowing their 
current contact information is the first challenge. Getting a 
signature for any consent to an appointment of trustee poses 
another challenge, given that the person may not have an attorney-
in-fact appointed to sign documents and the elderly sibling may not 
be able to sign themselves. Generally, if all next of kin consent to 
the appointment, the court will appoint the trustee without a 
hearing.73 However, a hearing may be necessary if consent is 
unobtainable due to the advanced age of a sibling, which further 
adds to the expense of appointing a trustee. Remember that the 
appointment may be sought to simply get authority to receive and 
review medical records for the possibility that a claim may be 
brought. More often than not, the siblings want nothing to do with 
the legal claim and appointment of trustee, but the law requires 
that the trustee represent the elderly sibling. 
Second, if a claim is brought by the trustee, any settlement or 
award must be disclosed to the next of kin to allow them to consent 
to the distribution and/or have an opportunity to be heard in a 
court hearing. Given that most of the time the siblings are 
uninvolved with the decedent, it is often reasonable for them to 
receive no recovery. However, the trustee runs the risk that a 
sibling—if able—may object to little to no recovery and thus 
change expectations of the next of kin as to recovery. For example, 
usually the children are bringing the claim and divide any award 
amongst themselves, given the lack of connection of the decedent 
to his or her siblings at that time. 
Finally, in an older resident, second marriages, adopted, or 
long-lost children are not uncommon. In one case, the decedent 
had long ago ceased contact with his biological children for several 
 
 71.  MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 144.01. 
 72.  Id. R. 144.01. 
 73.  Id. R. 144.02. 
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reasons, yet the stepfather of the children did not adopt them. The 
children were difficult to locate and the process brought about 
many painful memories regarding a father they never really knew 
who was now tragically dead as a result of an incident in a nursing 
home. Determining who are the next of kin is a process in and of 
itself that is quite complex given decades’ worth of family dynamics. 
Again, the risk is not simply in getting a trustee appointment but 
also in agreement as to any distribution. Families in conflict over 
distribution due to dredging up past painful memories diverts the 
attention from the true focus of the trustee and wrongful death 
process—standing in the shoes of the decedent to seek 
accountability for a breach of standard of care, not punishing the 
family for past disagreements. 
F. Pain and Suffering Damages in Minnesota 
There are no pain and suffering damages in Minnesota once the 
resident dies, which sends the wrong message to providers of long-
term care. 
 
Under current Minnesota law, the greatest disadvantage to 
elder clients is that there is no meaningful way to account for injury 
once the client dies—namely because, under Minnesota law, the 
pain and suffering of the decedent does not survive.74 Thus, one of 
the main measures of damages for the client dies with him or her. 
While death due to negligence is always tragic, pain and suffering 
damages may not be missed as sorely as in a claim involving a 
younger plaintiff. Unlike younger, employed plaintiffs, the elder 
client is not employed at the time of injury and cannot collect lost 
wages, loss of earning capacity, or often future medical costs. 
Available damages in a wrongful death claim involving a nursing 
home resident, for instance, are generally the medical bills; funeral 
bills; and the loss of aid, comfort, and society to family members 
left behind.75 The pool of damages is not that large to begin with 
 
 74.  Fussner v. Andert, 261 Minn. 347, 351–52, 113 N.W.2d 355, 358 (1961) 
(ruling that damages in a wrongful death action are for pecuniary loss and not for 
pain and suffering); Bremer v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & S.S.M. Ry. Co., 96 Minn. 
469, 470, 105 N.W. 494, 494 (1905) (quoting Hutchins v. St. Paul, Minneapolis & 
Manitoba Ry. Co., 44 Minn. 5, 9, 46 N.W. 79 (1890)) (noting that damages cannot 
be awarded for pain and suffering). 
 75.  See, e.g., Martz v. Revier, 284 Minn. 166, 170 N.W.2d 83 (1969); Andert, 
261 Minn. at 351–52, 113 N.W.2d at 358. 
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for a claim brought by the family of the resident. Even if future 
medical bills were able to be determined, given the multiple 
diagnoses and conditions suffered by the resident, the shorter 
anticipated life span would limit any future damages significantly. 
In addition, valuation of the loss of aid, comfort, and society of the 
next of kin does not make sense when the elder resident is at the 
time of life when family members give to the resident, not the 
other way around. While the loss of any loved one, no matter the 
age, is devastating, the law contemplates loss and calculates 
damages based on the middle-aged father of three and not the 
eighty-five-year-old great-grandmother. 
Perhaps the most significant effect of not allowing pain and 
suffering damages to survive the decedent is that without other 
meaningful damages available to the injured elder, providers of 
long-term care have little incentive to resolve claims. They may 
simply delay the claim until the person dies and the claim 
essentially goes away. Only special damages76 are available in an 
injury claim where the decedent died of causes unrelated to the 
injury. If the resident experienced abuse or neglect, yet did not 
receive medical treatment or incur medical bills, Minnesota 
Statutes section 573.01 states: 
A cause of action arising out of an injury to the person 
dies with the person of the party in whose favor it exists, 
except as provided in section 573.02. All other causes of 
action by one against another, whether arising on 
contract or not, survive to the personal representatives of 
the former and against those of the latter.77 
The exception referenced in the above statute is for the 
wrongful death of the decedent78 and personal injury where the 
death was from causes unrelated to the injury.79 Even under an 
injury claim with a death from unrelated causes pursuant to section 
573.02, subdivision 2, the only available damages are special 
damages for the injury, not pain and suffering.80 For the wrongful 
death claim, the available damages are pecuniary damages under 
 
 76.  Special damages are generally considered “economic damages” such as 
medical and funeral bills. See Range v. Buskirk Constr. Co., 281 Minn. 312, 318, 
161 N.W.2d 645, 649 (1968). 
 77.  MINN. STAT. § 573.01 (2014). 
 78.  Id. § 573.02, subdiv. 1. 
 79.  Id. § 573.01, subdiv. 2. 
 80.  Id. 
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subdivision 1.81 Pecuniary damages do not include the pain and 
suffering of the decedent under Minnesota law.82 All other causes 
of action related to injury die with the decedent. 
G. Expedited Litigation and Risk of Death Affects Available Damages 
A greater need for expedited litigation and a higher risk that the 
elder resident will die during the pendency of the claim 
significantly affects available damages. 
 
As previously discussed, there is little incentive for a provider 
to mediate or otherwise work efficiently to resolve an injury claim 
when the available damages change significantly upon death with 
the inability to recover for pain and suffering. However, if the 
parties cannot resolve the matter swiftly, at minimum, all courts 
should accommodate an expedited litigation process to keep the 
claim moving forward in a timely manner given the inherent 
disadvantage the elderly client faces. Yet, expedited litigation is not 
formally recognized in Minnesota courts for a medical malpractice 
case. The court system is currently piloting a mandatory expedited 
litigation track in Dakota and St. Louis County District Courts for 
certain civil claims but not medical malpractice.83 
H. Mediation May Not Be Ordered by a Judge 
When the court does not order the parties to mediation, it 
works another significant disadvantage on elderly clients. Courts 
generally favor ordering the parties to mediation prior to going to 
trial to see if the parties can resolve the matter. In medical 
malpractice cases, the court is to require the parties to discuss 
whether the parties may agree upon alternative dispute 
 
 81.  Id. § 573.02, subdiv. 1. 
 82.  See Skifstrom v. City of Coon Rapids, 524 N.W.2d 294 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1994) (explaining the difference between general damages and pecuniary 
damages). 
 83.  See MINN. JUDICIAL BRANCH, SPECIAL RULES FOR THE PILOT EXPEDITED CIVIL 
LITIGATION TRACK, http://www.mncourts.gov/Documents/0/Public/Rules 
/Special_Rules_for_Pilot_ELT.pdf (last visited May 8, 2016). Arguably injury 
claims against a nursing home, assisted living facility, and home health care 
provider are considered medical malpractice claims pursuant to Minnesota 
Statutes section 145.61. However, some injuries—such as abuse and neglect—have 
common-law injury standards and, at a minimum, those claims should be made 
available to expedited litigation tracks as currently defined by the courts. 
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resolution.84 At times the court may not order mediation or 
another form of alternative dispute resolution unless the parties all 
agree to such a proceeding.85 Not ordering mediation is a great 
disservice to the plaintiff in a medical malpractice case involving an 
elderly claimant. The finite pool of damages, the impact on 
damages if a death occurs, and the distinction between medical 
malpractice in long-term care versus acute care settings all force 
parties into expensive and drawn out litigation. This effect runs 
afoul of public policies protecting vulnerable adults elsewhere in 
the law. 
In addition, providers often try to force plaintiffs to alternative 
dispute resolution while not agreeing to the same at a plaintiff’s 
request, revealing a disparity in power and unconscionable 
procedures. For instance, many binding, mandatory arbitration 
agreements are appearing in nursing home and assisted living 
contracts, usually presented as one signature required among many 
to admit the resident.86 Such arbitration agreements affect the legal 
rights of the plaintiff; most notably, the ability to be awarded 
punitive damages may be limited in arbitration while a jury may 
award such punitive damages.87 Providers are not averse to forcing 
alternative dispute resolution themselves, but they often object to 
being forced to mediation. Furthermore, under Minnesota Statutes 
section 484.73, the court is authorized to establish a mandatory, 
 
 84.  Minnesota law provides the following: 
At the time a trial judge orders a case for trial, the court shall require 
the parties to discuss and determine whether a form of alternative 
dispute resolution would be appropriate or likely to resolve some or all 
of the issues in the case. Alternative dispute resolution may include 
arbitration, mediation, summary jury trial, or other alternatives 
suggested by the court or parties, and may be either binding or 
nonbinding. All parties must agree unanimously before alternative 
dispute resolution proceeds. 
MINN. STAT. § 604.11, subdiv. 2. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  See Marmet Healthcare Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1203–04 
(2012) (holding that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts any state law 
prohibiting arbitration provisions in nursing home contracts and ending a circuit 
court split on the issue). See generally Suzanne M. Scheller, Arbitrating Wrongful 
Death Claims for Nursing Home Patients: What is Wrong with this Picture and How to 
Make it “More” Right, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 527 (2008). 
 87.  See MINN. STAT. § 549.20 (providing guidance on punitive damages). 
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non-binding arbitration system.88 While certain claims are 
excluded, medical malpractice is not excluded: 
Judicial arbitration may not be used to dispose of matters 
relating to guardianship, conservatorship, or civil 
commitment, matters within the juvenile court 
jurisdiction involving children in need of protection or 
services or delinquency, matters involving termination of 
parental rights under sections 260C.301 to 260C.328, or 
matters arising under sections 518B.01, 626.557, or 
144.651 to 144.652.89 
Particularly due to the increased use by providers of pre-
dispute, binding arbitration agreements, the court should view 
ordering mediation as a means to level the playing field and should 
not allow providers to pick and choose when they wish to engage in 
a non-binding alternative dispute resolution process such as 
mediation. After all, the law does not force resolution at mediation. 
I. Notification of Subrogation Interest Without Knowing Final Interest 
The need to notify Medicare of a possible subrogation interest, 
and yet not knowing the final interest until after settlement 
 
Virtually every elderly client has Medicare health insurance.90 
As with any health insurance company, a plaintiff’s attorney must 
notify Medicare of the liability claim to determine any subrogation 
interest that needs to be paid back to Medicare. The rationale is 
that, if Medicare paid a medical bill on behalf of a beneficiary and 
the medical bill was incurred as a result of injury due to the 
negligence of another, Medicare is owed the payments made. The 
process for reporting, receiving related charges, and ultimately 
determining a final demand amount is complex and time-
consuming. The most challenging piece in the process is not 
knowing the final amount of the Medicare subrogation interest 
until after settlement. This lack of knowledge makes it very difficult 
at times to get the client’s authority to settle the claim because they 
are unsure how much will need to be paid to Medicare. Estimates 
of the subrogation interest are available before settlement, but 
 
 88.  Id. § 484.73, subdiv. 1. 
 89.  Id. § 484.73, subdiv. 2. 
 90.  Medicare health insurance is available to those ages sixty-five or older. See 
42 U.S.C. § 1395o(2) (2014). 
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Medicare reserves the right to add to the estimate up until the 
request for the final demand amount, which has indeed happened 
on numerous occasions.91 Defendants routinely make proof of 
satisfaction of the Medicare subrogation interest a term of any 
settlement due to their own legal obligations when it comes to 
reporting a liability claim. 
J. Claimant Not Receiving Benefit of Recent Case Law 
A claimant not receiving the benefit of recent case law that 
indicates that any award not be reduced by the amount of 
Medicare subrogation payments. 
 
Injury claims where the claimant is an elderly client involve 
Medicare. Medicare makes payments related to the injury claimed 
on behalf of the claimant but often writes off between 50% and 
75% of the bill. This means that if the hospital billed $50,000 in 
care related to the injury, Medicare may pay $25,000 and write off 
$25,000, meaning simply not paying the remaining $25,000 and not 
allowing the patient to be billed for that amount, resulting in the 
hospital simply adjusting their bill to $25,000, the amount paid by 
Medicare. Payments made by health insurance companies related 
to the injury on behalf of the claimant are generally called 
“collateral source” payments.92 If the claim went to trial, the jury 
would hear about the full amount of any medical bills, not the 
amount of payments by a collateral source.93 The collateral source 
payments are only presented in a post-trial motion to request a 
reduction of any award based on an offset for collateral source 
payments.94 However, related payments made by Medicare are not 
considered collateral source payments because they are payments 
made under the Social Security Act pursuant to Minnesota Statutes 
 
 91.  In this author’s experience, the amounts added by Medicare to the final 
demand amount, over and above Medicare’s estimate, range from hundreds to 
thousands of dollars. 
 92.  MINN. STAT. § 548.251, subdiv. 1. 
 93.  Id. § 548.251, subdiv. 5. 
 94.  Id. § 548.251, subdiv. 2. The theory is that a plaintiff should not be 
allowed double recovery, meaning if a medical bill related to an injury totaled 
$1,000 and the health insurance company paid $800 (and wrote off $200), any jury 
award may be reduced by the court to $800, or the amount of the collateral source 
payment, offset by the amount in health insurance premiums for the two years 
prior to the injury paid by claimant. See id. 
23
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section 548.251, subdivision 1(2), and are therefore excluded.95 
Renswick v. Wenzel confirms that Medicare payments are not 
considered collateral source payments.96 
However, most claims on behalf of an elderly claimant settle 
without a jury trial. There are no post-trial motions where the 
subrogation interest is revealed and no determination by the court 
that Medicare subrogation interests are not collateral source 
payments and that the claimant is entitled to the full amount of the 
medical bills under a Renswick analysis. Defendants have an 
obligation to report a Medicare subrogation interest.97 Once 
reported, the claimant and defendant have an obligation to satisfy 
the subrogation interest. Defendants often press to see the detailed 
Medicare subrogation interest under the guise of their reporting 
and satisfaction obligation. Much of the time, the information is 
used to find out the actual amount owed by a claimant, and any 
subsequent settlement offers do not reflect the actual billed 
amounts the claimant is entitled to under Renswick, but rather the 
subrogation amount. With 50–75% write offs, the ability to have 
meaningful recovery is limited for the elderly claimant. 
K. Good Faith Insurance Law Does Not Provide Proper Tools 
Good faith insurance law in Minnesota does not provide the tools 
to keep a claim moving, such as distinguishing what is 
“reasonable” in a claim involving and elderly client. 
 
Minnesota law requires timely and appropriate responses from 
an insurance company in a liability claim, such as that involving an 
injury in a nursing home. Minnesota Statutes sections 72A.17 
through 72A.32 regulate insurance practices and are intended to 
prevent an insurance company from being non-responsive and 
obstructionist when given notice of a claim.98 When an attorney 
attempts to work in good faith with an insurance adjuster to resolve 
a medical malpractice matter, the insurance laws are intended to 
ensure that the insurance company also operates in good faith. 
 
 95.  Id. § 548.251, subdiv. 1(2). 
 96.  819 N.W.2d 198, 211 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012). 
 97.  Defendant’s reporting duty arises out of the Medicare, Medicaid, and 
section 111 of the SCHIP Extension Act of 2007 (commonly referred to as Section 
111 of the MMSEA). 
 98.  MINN. STAT. §§ 72A.17–.32. 
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However, the good faith insurance laws do not take into account an 
expedited review or are loosely regulated without an understanding 
of the effect of delay on an elderly client. Below is a sampling of 
specific provisions of the good faith insurance laws that could be 
bolstered to ensure good faith in claims involving vulnerable 
adults. 
1. Demanding Information that Would Not Affect Settlement99 
As stated above, Medicare has reporting requirements for both 
claimants and defendants. However, the requirement refers to 
notifying Medicare of the claim; it does not refer to receiving 
detailed information about related Medicare payments. In 
negotiations with insurance companies or defense attorneys, 
sometimes no settlement offer will be made without receipt of not 
just the estimated Medicare subrogation interest but also the 
detailed listing of related payments made by Medicare. Defendants 
often want to see the detailed listing to argue that certain line items 
are not related and therefore any settlement offer will not include 
such line items. Such detailed information does not affect the 
settlement since the claimant (and by extension the defendant) is 
responsible for paying the subrogation interest in its entirety, 
regardless of what the defendant believes is related. Demanding a 
detailed listing goes beyond any necessary information that would 
affect settlements in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 
72A.201, subdivision 4(9).100 
2. Not Ensuring Prompt and Fair Processing of Claims101 
Subdivision 1 states that rules governing the processing of 
insurance claims were adopted to “ensure the prompt, fair, and 
honest processing of claims and complaints.”102 The definitions of 
the terms are not defined in law, particularly as related to claims 
 
 99.  Id. § 72A.201, subdiv. 4(9) (providing that it is an unfair practice for the 
insurance company to demand “information which would not affect the 
settlement of the claim”). 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Id. § 72A.201, subdiv. 1. Similarly, this delayed processing also violates 
Minnesota Statutes section 72A.20, subdivision 12(5), which prohibits failing to 
affirm or deny coverage within a reasonable period of time. Id. § 72A.201, subdiv. 
12(5). 
 102.  Id. § 72A.201, subdiv. 1. 
25
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brought by a vulnerable adult. To a client with multiple health 
issues and perhaps imminent death, “prompt” should be given 
special meaning. Special protections for vulnerable adults and 
elderly individuals are recognized elsewhere in Minnesota law, 
including a public policy of protecting vulnerable adults and 
awarding special damages for certain behavior against senior 
citizens.103 
3. Failure to Acknowledge Receipt of Notice of a Claim104 
Once notice of a claim is given, the name, phone number, and 
other contact information of the insurance analyst is to be provided 
within ten business days of receipt of the notice.105 It is possible that 
the contact information is not provided for months, which violates 
this section and also delays the claim. 
4. Failure to Act Reasonably Promptly upon Communications106 
Once notice of a claim is made, the insurer must respond with 
reasonable promptness.107 Delays in response to everything from a 
request for contact information to a response to a demand, can 
take six to nine months or more. Again, given the vulnerability of 
the elderly claimant and the substantial impact of pain and 
suffering damages being unavailable once the claimant dies, 
“reasonably promptly” should be defined under Minnesota’s good 
faith insurance laws. 
L. Plaintiff Ineligible as a Result of Settlement Amount or Jury Award 
The possibility that an injured plaintiff on Medical Assistance 
may become ineligible for Medical Assistance as a result of any 
settlement amount or jury award. 
 
Long-term care residents receiving Medical Assistance108 
benefits must have less than $3,000 in assets to maintain their 
 
 103.  See id. §§ 626.557–.5573; see also id. § 325F.71 (enhancing penalties for 
consumer fraud against senior citizens and disabled individuals). 
 104.  Id. § 72A.201, subdiv. 4(1). 
 105.  Id. § 72A.201, subdivs. 4(1)–(2). 
 106.  Id. § 72A.20, subdiv. 12(2). 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  “Medical Assistance,” Minnesota’s version of Medicaid, means “payment 
of part or all of the cost of the care and services identified in section 256B.0625, 
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eligibility.109 When an injury claim is made on behalf of an elderly 
client, any settlement disbursement or jury award must be disclosed 
to the county overseeing Medical Assistance eligibility.110 The 
question remains how such a settlement or jury award will be 
counted by Medical Assistance and whether the resident can retain 
Medical Assistance benefits. The answer hinges on whether such 
award is considered an “available asset” to pay for the resident’s 
long-term care, thus disqualifying him or her from Medical 
Assistance, or whether such an award is considered “unavailable” 
and not counted when determining ongoing Medical Assistance 
eligibility.111 
A person over the age of sixty-five receiving Medical Assistance 
benefits in Minnesota is not allowed to place any settlement funds 
into a special or supplemental needs trust because those trusts are 
only available if the grantor or beneficiary is under the age of sixty-
five.112 However, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(C), a 
disabled person of any age may place funds in a pooled trust as an 
excluded asset not counted in Medical Assistance eligibility.113 
 
for eligible individuals whose income and resources are insufficient to meet all of 
this cost.” Id. § 256B.02, subdiv. 8. 
 109.  See MINN. DEP’T. OF HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH CARE PROGRAMS MANUAL ch. 
19.05 (2015) [hereinafter HCPM], http://hcopub.dhs.state.mn.us/hcpmsrc 
/19_05.htm. 
 110.  See MINN. STAT. § 256B.056, subdiv. 9(c)(3). 
 111.  See generally id. § 256B.056 (discussing eligibility requirements for medical 
assistance and naming certain assets as “available”). 
 112.  See id. § 501B.89; id. § 256B.056, subdivs. 3b(a)–(b) (providing 
requirements of a supplemental needs trust); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)–(d) 
(2012)(providing the requirements of a special needs trust). 
 113.  The requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(C) in order to exclude 
assets from a pooled trust when considering medical assistance eligibility are as 
follows: 
(C) A trust containing the assets of an individual who is disabled . . . 
that meets the following conditions: 
(i) The trust is established and managed by a nonprofit 
association. 
(ii) A separate account is maintained for each beneficiary of the 
trust, but, for purposes of investment and management of funds, 
the trust pools these accounts. 
(iii) Accounts in the trust are established solely for the benefit of 
individuals who are disabled (as defined in section 1382c(a)(3) 
of this title) by the parent, grandparent, or legal guardian of such 
individuals, by such individuals, or by a court. 
(iv) To the extent that amounts remaining in the beneficiary’s 
27
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Minnesota has historically not recognized the federal law on point, 
which considers a pooled trust to be an excluded asset.114 However, 
recent litigation has paved the way for elderly clients to place any 
settlement funds in a pooled trust without the resident losing 
Medical Assistance eligibility.115 Because the pooled trust practice is 
relatively new and not confirmed in all counties, the possibility 
exists that one county may yet consider the pooled trust funds to be 
an available asset and thus disqualify the resident for Medical 
Assistance benefits.116 Such a finding would cause the resident to 
use the settlement funds to pay for long-term care prior to 
becoming eligible for Medical Assistance once more.117 
The stripping of Medical Assistance benefits disadvantages the 
elder client in that the claimant may use settlement funds to pay 
the very nursing home that injured him or her for care. In 
addition, the required proof and correspondence necessary to 
qualify again for Medical Assistance may be beyond the claimant’s 
ability, and no agent or family member may be available to assist. 
M. Difficulty in Separating Damages for Pain and Suffering 
There is difficulty in separating out damages for pain and 
suffering in a vulnerable resident. 
 
As stated elsewhere in this article, damages in a medical 
malpractice claim involving the elderly claimant include medical 
bills, pain and suffering, and possibly other special or pecuniary 
 
account upon the death of the beneficiary are not retained by the 
trust, the trust pays to the State from such remaining amounts in 
the account an amount equal to the total amount of medical 
assistance paid on behalf of the beneficiary under the State plan 
under this subchapter. 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(C). 
 114.  See MINN. STAT. § 256B.0595, subdiv. 1(j) (imposing a transfer penalty 
when transferring funds into a pooled trust for person over age sixty-five). 
 115.  See Peittersen v. Minn. Dep’t of Human Servs., No. 19HA-CV-11-5630 
(Dakota Cty. Ct. Oct. 2, 2012) (reversing a prior holding by finding that a transfer 
of a seventy-three-year-old woman on Medical Assistance into a pooled trust for 
less than fair market value was arbitrary and capricious); see also Lewis v. 
Alexander, 685 F.3d 325 (3d Cir. 2012) (finding that state law was impermissibly 
more restrictive than the federal law with respect to pooled special needs trusts). 
 116.  But see HCPM, supra note 109, at ch. 19.25.35.25 (providing support for 
consistent interpretation by every county of pooled trusts as an excluded asset). 
 117.  Id. 
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damages.118 Given that pain and suffering is one of the few damages 
available to the claimant, proving that element is significant. Yet 
due to the vulnerability of the resident—the very condition that 
caused them to need long-term care—the ability to prove pain and 
suffering can be difficult. For instance, defendants may argue that a 
client with dementia or quadriplegia feels no pain. A patient who is 
non-verbal may show a “zero” pain rating in the medical records, 
thus leading a person to the conclusion that the resident felt no 
pain, not taking into account that the resident cannot verbalize 
pain. Simply because the resident cannot verbalize pain does not 
mean that he or she feels none. Residents with dementia often 
exhibit behaviors that are indicative of the experience of pain. 
Again, the law disadvantages the elderly claimant when using 
traditional markers of pain and suffering in a non-verbal or 
wheelchair-bound client. Without other available damages, the law 
seems to re-victimize the vulnerable adult when he or she tries to 
seek accountability for harm. 
N. Expert Review Not Designed for Claims Against Long-Term Care 
Minnesota’s expert review statute is not designed for claims 
against ever-evolving models of long-term care. 
 
Minnesota Statutes section 145.682, subdivision 2, requires 
that a claim against a health care provider be reviewed by an expert 
who believes that negligence occurred, prior to bringing the claim: 
In an action alleging malpractice, error, mistake, or 
failure to cure, whether based on contract or tort, against 
a health care provider which includes a cause of action as 
to which expert testimony is necessary to establish a prima 
facie case, the plaintiff must: (1) unless otherwise 
provided in subdivision 3, paragraph (b), serve upon 
defendant with the summons and complaint an affidavit 
as provided in subdivision 3; and (2) serve upon 
defendant within 180 days after commencement of 
discovery under the Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 
26.04(a) an affidavit as provided by subdivision 4.119 
The statute goes on to state the conclusions of the expert that 
are necessary to bring the claim: 
 
 118.  See supra Section III.F. 
 119.  MINN. STAT. § 145.682, subdiv. 2. 
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The affidavit required by subdivision 2, clause (1), must 
be by the plaintiff’s attorney and state that: 
(a) the facts of the case have been reviewed by the 
plaintiff’s attorney with an expert whose qualifications 
provide a reasonable expectation that the expert’s 
opinions could be admissible at trial and that, in the 
opinion of this expert, one or more defendants deviated 
from the applicable standard of care and by that action 
caused injury to the plaintiff; or 
(b) the expert review required by paragraph (a) could not 
reasonably be obtained before the action was commenced 
because of the applicable statute of limitations. If an 
affidavit is executed pursuant to this paragraph, the 
affidavit in paragraph (a) must be served on defendant or 
the defendant’s counsel within 90 days after service of the 
summons and complaint.120 
The requirement of expert review has many ramifications for 
the elderly claimant, particularly as it relates to the effect of any 
potential delay in receiving medical records in order to secure the 
expert review and in finding a medical professional with knowledge 
of the particular long-term care setting to opine that negligence 
occurred.121 This review is arguably necessary even when bringing a 
common-law negligence or breach of contract claim, as it appears 
tied to the status of the defendant as a health care provider and not 
to the type of claim being brought. 
Long-term care is ever-evolving and new care models are still 
being created, making it challenging for a plaintiff to find medical 
professionals on point to not only the type of care at issue, such as 
wound care or falls, but also in the setting at issue, such as an 
assisted living facility or residential care home. The expert review 
statute accounts for filing suit without the expert review due to an 
imminent statute of limitations, but it also should allow for filing 
suit without the expert review due to an imminent death.122 
IV. ANALYSIS 
When determining how the current state of the law affects 
older adults, consider the following examples that highlight the 
 
 120.  Id. § 145.682, subdiv. 3.  
 121.  See id. § 145.682. 
 122.  See id. 
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need for reform in the law to account for the vulnerability and 
disadvantages inherent in the law for an elderly claimant. 
A. Example 1 
Jane Doe is a resident of a nursing home; she falls during a 
transfer by staff from her bed to her wheelchair and breaks her hip. 
She is eighty-five years old and suffers from congestive heart failure 
and dementia. She is not a surgical candidate and returns to the 
nursing home for rest and rehabilitation. However, due to her 
immobility from the fracture, she contracts pneumonia and dies 
twenty days after the fall. She has two siblings in nursing homes out 
of state. She left no will. Her closest relative is one niece who was 
not involved with her care. 
Some potential barriers to bringing any claim on behalf of 
Jane include the following: (1) none of the existing family 
members likely have standing to retrieve medical records to 
investigate the claim—her siblings are deteriorating in health 
themselves and they, like her niece, were likely not involved with 
her care prior to her death;123(2) it appears that a trustee must be 
appointed to even retrieve medical records,124 yet securing the 
consent of the siblings in the nursing home will be a challenge—
the niece will likely need to notify all other relatives at her same 
relational level to Jane,125 meaning all other nieces and nephews, 
who may or may not consent to appointment—and a hearing will 
likely be required to appoint a trustee,126 adding to the expense and 
public nature of the process; and (3) due to her multiple health 
conditions and the time span between the fall and death, isolating 
the fall as a reason for the cause of death (rather than her 
congestive heart failure) may be a challenge for the coroner and 
 
 123.  See MINN. STAT. § 573.02, subdiv. 2 (designating the trustee in an action 
for death by wrongful act as the “next of kin”); 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(c) (2015) 
(including a list of required specifications for obtaining authorized disclosures of 
medical records); see also HIPAA What to Expect, supra note 68 (stating that 
authorization is obtainable but that inevitable delays in record requests are 
burdensome for elderly clients). 
 124.  See Ortiz v. Gavenda, 590 N.W.2d 119, 122–23 (Minn. 1999) (citing Regie 
de l’assurance Auto. du Quebec v. Jensen, 399 N.W.2d 85 (Minn. 1987)) 
(discussing the requirement of an appointed trustee in order to bring a wrongful 
death claim). 
 125.  See MINN. STAT. § 573.02, subdiv. 3. 
 126.  See MINN. R. GEN. PRAC. 144.02. 
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the cause of death may not reflect the fall as a condition precedent 
to her decline. 
B. Example 2 
Frank Doe is sixty-six years old and receives services in an 
assisted living facility for his quadriplegia suffered during an 
accident when he was younger. He is also diagnosed with Type I 
diabetes. He receives two insulin injections per day. He relies on 
staff for frequent turning and repositioning as well as devices to 
float his heels off the bed. He developed wounds on his feet and 
could not move his feet and legs due to paraplegia. The wounds 
developed gangrene, and he required bilateral below-the-knee 
amputations. Frank receives Medical Assistance benefits. A notice 
of claim was given three months ago to the liability insurance 
carrier for the assisted living with no response. 
Some potential barriers to bringing any claim on behalf of 
Frank include the following: (1) because Frank receives Medical 
Assistance benefits, any settlement or award that he receives must 
be disclosed to the county; he either becomes ineligible for Medical 
Assistance until his assets return to being under $3,000, or he 
creates a pooled trust that he believes will not be treated as a 
prohibited transfer for less than fair market value;127 (2) due to his 
quadriplegia, he cannot describe pain in his legs from the wounds 
or the amputation, although he knows that the wounds are painful 
due to sensations and other factors; and (3) good faith insurance 
laws state that the insurance company provide contact information 
within ten days, but as a third-party claimant, Frank has little ability 
to force a response from the insurance carrier in order to keep the 
claim moving. 
C. Example 3 
Mary Doe resided in a memory care unit for help with her 
activities of daily living because of her frontal temporal lobe 
dementia. She resisted care because her mind could no longer 
regulate her actions. She was sexually assaulted by a staff member. 
She did not go to the hospital; therefore, no medical bills related to 
the assault were incurred. She if often non-verbal due to her 
dementia and her low cognitive ability to process information. It 
 
 127.  See supra notes 103–05 and accompanying text. 
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was later learned that the employee sexually assaulted other 
residents due to lack of supervision of the employee. She signed a 
pre-dispute, binding arbitration agreement as part of the admission 
agreement three years ago. 
Some potential barriers to bringing any claim on behalf of 
Mary include the following: (1) because she has dementia, she may 
not have a health care directive or financial power of attorney (or 
have the requisite capacity to appoint one now) granting an agent 
the authority to bring a claim on her behalf or retrieve her medical 
records;128(2) if she dies prior to bringing the claim, she may 
receive no monetary award since pain and suffering damages are 
not available to her after death and she incurred no medical bills 
due to the nature of the injury;129 (3) if pain and suffering damages 
prevail, due to her lack of cognitive ability, she is not able to 
verbalize her pain and suffering as a result of the sexual assault and 
the incident was not witnessed;130 (4) Mary would still need to give 
notice to Medicare and other health insurance companies, even 
though no medical bills were incurred, causing delay to the process 
with Medicare taking up to sixty-five days for an initial estimate of 
related payments;131 (5) the case may be appropriate for punitive 
damages given the reckless disregard for the safety of residents by 
allowing multiple sexual assaults, yet punitive damages may be 
unlikely to be awarded in the arbitration process;132 and (6) an 
expert may have little information to review in the memory care 
unit related to pain or otherwise, due to the resident being non-
verbal, and depending on the license of the memory care setting, 
the documentation standards may be low, thus not yielding 
extensive information. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In many ways, the long-term care system in Minnesota is 
advanced and poised to meet the increasing demands of health 
care for the older population. However, injuries do occur and the 
law must facilitate accountability. Under the current laws, several 
barriers exist to investigating, bringing, and prevailing in a medical 
 
 128.  See supra Sections III.A–.D.  
 129.  See MINN. STAT. § 573.02 (2014). 
 130.  See id.  
 131.  See supra Section III.I. 
 132.  See id.; see also supra note 74 and accompanying text.  
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malpractice action against a long-term care provider. This article 
highlights those barriers and raises awareness, at minimum. 
Beyond the minimum, it is hoped that some of the laws can be 
changed to better account for claims brought by older, vulnerable 
adults. The current laws send the wrong message to providers that 
even in the face of the most egregious injury, the claims may go 
away, not because the provider did no wrong, but because the 
barriers snuff out the voices of the residents or decedents. Public 
policy and the principles of justice demand better for long-term 
care residents and vulnerable adults. 
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